

HKX

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

C 21 April 1976

UNCLASSIFIEDMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Derek Bok, President, Harvard University
Robben W. Flemming, President,
University of Michigan
Richard W. Lyman, President,
Stanford University
David S. Saxon, President,
University of California

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Harold H. Saunders, Director, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PR*

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, April 21, 1976
1:15 - 2:35 p.m. (luncheon)

PLACE:

Monroe-Madison Room
Department of State

Kissinger: State Department protocol is unfailing. Let's see how they ranked you!

[There was small talk as the luncheon was served.]

Lyman: You know, in a group of university presidents, no one is really a spokesman!

Bok: Should we turn to our issues?

Lyman: Dave Saxon and I were struck by our brief conversation with you in San Francisco. You used words like "a loss of confidence in the academic community."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

Kissinger: I don't know about a "loss of confidence", but there is certainly very little communication.

Lyman: Even if there were more money, it wouldn't solve the problem. There is a long and undignified history of academia thinking that money would solve the problem. But without money you probably can't. We four thought we'd talk about where it's hurting -- what needs to change, and what sort of approaches, and by whom, would help.

In universities there is a pervasive distrust of all institutions, including the institution of government. To get the specifics of your problem would be helpful, we thought.

Kissinger: I'm grateful. I know the conditions; I've suffered under it for eight years in Washington. It can be argued who is responsible for it. It is probably the fault of both sides. In the late '50's and early '60's, a number of us at Harvard thought it appropriate to have a seminar on a national problem and construct middle-term solutions. We thought it would have impact somewhere, even though most of my colleagues were hostile to the Eisenhower Administration.

When I came here, I thought that because of my academic associations, I could maintain contact. For many reasons -- but largely because of the Vietnam War -- it hasn't happened.

In my forays around the country.... I haven't gone to universities, by sort of mutual agreement. [Laughter]. I've not been exactly deluged with invitations. We have this problem.

I also believe we shouldn't gear it to the elections. If there are financial problems, perhaps we can do that.

Whoever wins the election should restore communications with academia. It is inconceivable that the segment of the community that thinks most about the future can't be made more relevant.

All of what we've done in arms control has essentially come out of our work at Harvard and MIT in the '50's. After the next SALT agreement, we'll be out of ideas.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-3-

Bok: Let's use that as an example. You were up there meeting [on March 11] with the Paul Doty group. They purport to be working on it.

Kissinger: I can't complain about the Doty group. They're too much at the beginning of their work for one to judge.

Academic life is splitting into three groups. Kennedy was a disaster because until the early '60's none of us ever believed we could run anything. [Laughter]. There is one group which is so obsessed with getting a job in the next Administration that they're practically extensions of the political process. Brzezinski isn't an academician, but a bright guy looking for a job. There is a second group that is working on things too abstrusely to be of any help. The third group is so turned off that they think the government is run by a bunch of knaves.

The Arms Control Group is a combination of old warriors and new guys for whom I couldn't get a feel. The Western European Seminar is a group of people dedicated to bringing the Communists into power in Italy. They may be right, but their life is dedicated to it. This is a difference of perspective. If I were at Harvard, I probably would conclude it's inevitable. But as Secretary of State, should I legitimize them now or make it harder for them? But this is a short-term problem. What is Europe to be like in five years from now? What vision should we have? That I didn't get from them -- many of whom are my friends.

Bok: I've been worried about the same thing. I talked to Paul [Doty] about this -- about the arms controllers falling into two camps. One is an extension of journalism, worried about the next arms control agreements, against those working so abstrusely that they're not relevant.

Kissinger: Where the government is weakest is five years ahead. Fifteen years ahead is beyond anyone's comprehension. The current stuff they can't know because they don't know all the details.

Lord: So the tactical stuff isn't useful and the long-term stuff can't be related to policymaking.

Lyman: You made a statement that it's arguable who is responsible for this.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-4-

Kissinger: We've been through the Vietnam period and the Nixon period. Nixon, it's fair to say, wasn't too receptive to academic concerns.

The overwhelming attribute of decisions at a high level of government is you never really know what you're doing. When the scope for action is greatest, the facts are the least available. When the facts overwhelm you, the scope for action has gone.

Lyman: [Laughs] You have four very sympathetic.....

Kissinger: You have the same problems, I'm sure. So you have to act on facts that you can't prove. So you have compulsive insecurity, and also constant harassment. The press gloats over any possibility they can find of a credibility gap. But you can assert what is in fact the truth and still be accused of a credibility gap. The lack of compassion from academia exacerbates the problem.

Flemming: We too suffer the same thing, and from the same people. When you try to build a career on the basis of integrity and credibility, what is hard to bear is when everything you say is suspect.

It may be changing this year. Among the students and faculty there is more civility.

Kissinger: The students may be in better shape than the faculty.

Flemming: You just know on any campus that there will be groups that have deliberately set out to harass.

Kissinger: I don't think anything should be attempted on the problem I have set out until after the election.

Lyman: It is not easy to conceive of any other establishment that can provide the intellectual capital that academia has.

Kissinger: I agree.

Lyman: So there is a funding problem.

Kissinger: Let's talk about that a bit.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-5-

Lyman: We'd like to leave with you a short paper on the funding of centers for advanced research, to be administered by the State Department, preferably, in the amount of \$4 million.

Kissinger: Didn't we do that?

Saunders: Last year it was mostly for projects.

Lyman: The Hong Kong Center.

Lord: The China Center.

Lyman: But that was a short-term thing.

Kissinger: How do we get \$4 million?

Saunders: The easiest is to use the National Defense Education Act, which is under HEW. We'd have to ask for authority.

Lyman: You have to ask Congress? Even with money you already have?

Saunders: We only have \$800,000.

Kissinger: We would need a new appropriation. Why do you want the State Department to do it?

Bok: Because the Office of Education is heavily oriented to instruction -- primary, secondary. The whole question of building -- really it's maintaining -- a research base -- there is no one at HEW who recognizes quality research.

Saxon: There was more receptivity in State.

Kissinger: I've no objection to having it in State. But often it is unwise to try to take something from other bureaucracy because there will be a brawl. It would be more effective to give my support to something in HEW.

Lyman: Fair enough. My feeling was that the \$13 million in HEW was for instruction.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-6-

Kissinger: I could talk to the Secretary of HEW. He strikes me as highly intelligent. I could tell him it's in the national interest to support these centers. Secondly, I could talk to the President about increasing the amounts, whether it's at HEW or State. What about DOD?

You want basic institutional support for these centers?

Lyman: The paper shows that it ranges from release times to library funds, etc.

Kissinger: I want to be clear: It's not just your four institutions?

Lyman: No. There are others.

Kissinger: \$4 million would cover how much?

Bok: The maintenance of the existing efforts going on. Ford [the Ford Foundation] is pulling out.

Kissinger: Really?

Bok: They were funding the Russian Research Center. Now all the grants are terminal.

Kissinger: How are they pulling out?

Lyman: They're cutting the budget by 50%.

Kissinger: At Harvard -- the institution with which I'm most familiar -- what sort of programs are affected? The Russian Research Center?

Bok: And the East Asian Research Center, and the West European Studies, and the Middle East Center.

Lord: Wouldn't that \$4 million be split up so much that it wouldn't go very far?

Bok: A few hundred thousand for the Russian Research Center would keep it going.

Kissinger: \$4 million would do it?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-7-

Lyman: It would keep it alive. It would do the First Aid job. It would keep those specialists in contact.

Kissinger: How much would it take to do it better?

Saxon: \$100 million. [Laughter].

Lyman: We'll deal with the short term now.

Kissinger: Anything less than double digit.... You could make as good a case for \$7 million as for \$4 million.

Saxon: \$4 million is the rock bottom need.

Lyman: A group of universities has been working with a group of foundation executives on areas where the universities are hurting. This may lead to a serious effort to save area studies; it could be \$80-\$90 million.

Kissinger: Supplied by the foundations?

Lyman: , They'll help us seek it from the government.

Kissinger: Take Middle East studies. Why can't you raise it from private corporations?

Bok: We can't raise enough. We've worked at it.

Flemming: We can raise some money; we can get some from the Middle East countries. But then, of course, we have to worry about strings attached. We went to Japan and they pledged to give \$10 million, of which we have \$6 million. We have to raise the rest from U.S. corporations. To do this you need articulate people. No one could be more articulate than Ed Reischauer. All his efforts, plus some help from John Fairbank, in two years we have \$700-\$800,000.

Kissinger: Amazing.

Bok: There just isn't enough money. The Russian Research Center is in worse shape. I put myself squarely in your camp of detente. If detente succeeds, there is less incentive to study -- if there is no threat of imminent destruction. There is a mood of interest in domestic concerns.. And if you want to raise money for a hockey rink, there is no problem.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-8-

Kissinger: Really?

Bok: Giving is a mixture of intellect and emotion. It has to hit the viscera.

Saxon: Isn't this precisely a case for federal support for the federal interest? In the partnership between universities and the federal government, isn't this particularly appropriate?

Kissinger: I'll be asked: Why do private universities need federal money?

Lyman: Because we're doing our damnedest [to raise money].

Kissinger: So we don't waste time: I'm perfectly prepared to get behind it. I may have caveats when we get to \$100 million.

Lyman: So will we!

Kissinger: But it would be better if these huge apparatuses are not out to subvert public confidence. I would want to keep the basic institutions intact.

Flemming: That is less real than apparent. It's less so now. The press always focuses on it.

Kissinger: Is that the faculty or the students?

Flemming: Both. We have had groups go to China and come back. It is very interesting to see an objective analysis, pros and cons -- good analysis. I don't think that [earlier] kind of attitude is as prevalent.

Kissinger: I am not looking for support for the policies of the Administration.

All: No, we understand.

Bok: If someone from the Department of State said "Here is half a million dollars, and here are a set of intellectually interesting research projects that would be in the interests of the country," you and I could find some faculty who wouldn't be right to do it but it would be easy to find qualified academics who could do it. If they're intellectually interesting. So it is not as if the kind of research you are interested in wouldn't be undertaken willingly.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-9-

Kissinger: How soon do you need the \$4 million?

Saunders: The next fiscal year. Perhaps for FY 1977. I have talked to the Budget Committee people.

Kissinger: All right, let me talk first to [Secretary of HEW] Mathews.

Saunders: We thought we would write a letter for you to send him, and then talk from it.

Kissinger: I would be willing to write a letter and then talk to him after I get back from Africa -- which will either be three days or two weeks. [Laughter]. I think some of my Ambassadors out there have decided it would be helpful to me if I see in person all of the outrage of the Africans. [Laughter].

Flemming: We have had trouble with money with Ford phasing out.

Kissinger: How about Rockefeller [the Rockefeller Foundation]? They probably don't have resources.

Saxon: They are helping us prepare submissions to the Federal Government.

Flemming: So \$4 million is the rock bottom figure.

Bok: They are funding specific problems but are not looking at preserving the institutions that are vehicles for attacking these problems.

Saxon: There are new forces, new categories of faculty -- who call themselves "radical economists, radical sociologists."

Lyman: Very self-consciously so.

Saxon: Yes. In Europe there are things you are interested in.

Kissinger: I don't detect hostility now at the universities, only indifference.

Lord: If we are good at anything, it is analysis.

Kissinger: It is my destiny in this Department to attend meetings whose outcome is already worked out. [Laughter]. Hal, do I take it there is a letter?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-10-

Saunders: I thought it might be a result of this meeting.

Lyman: We haven't seen it.

Bok: The letter we had is now inoperative because it was geared to the State Department.

Kissinger: From a selfish point of view, I would rather have it in State. So we would channel it. My instinct is it would lead to a brawl. I will talk to Mathews and if he agrees it can be in State, and if we both went to Congress....

Bok: The letter left it open.

Kissinger: I would prefer it in State.

Flemming: There is a very great hostility in Congress now to their Office of Education Group, because it is ineffectual.

Kissinger: Can I see the letter?

Lyman: [Hands over Tab A]. Here is the cover letter and a nine-page memo. We have a long-term paper, but it is only preliminary.

Kissinger: Can I have that too?

Lyman: Only on the understanding it is only preliminary.

Kissinger: If it's unclassified it won't leak. [Laughter].

Saxon: The problem is not all of us are agreed on it.

Kissinger: Is there any particular magic to \$4 million?

Saunders: Just thirty times \$150,000.

Lord: Wait a minute.....

Saunders: \$150,000 for 20 or 30 institutions.

Kissinger: I can't believe \$6 million is harder to get than \$4 million.

Saxon: It would be fifty percent more helpful.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-11-

Kissinger: [To Saunders] Get me a letter to Mathews tomorrow. I should do it without university Presidents, but as my idea. It can't be \$150,000 for each center. Not every center....

Lord: And you have to show what would happen without the money,

Kissinger: Give me a breakdown of the \$6 million, on the understanding we will go to \$4 million if we have to.

I am prepared to testify to Congressional committees that it is in the national interest. I would like to talk to Mathews the week of the 10th, because the budgetary process will be fixed after that.

If he and I agree, we could do it under joint sponsorship. If he thinks it should stay in HEW, I won't fight because we would have to take it to the President.

Saunders: We could offer him someone to help administer it.

Kissinger: Or set up a joint committee.

Lyman: The question is how many books are enough? How much research is enough?

Saunders: We have to show what areas need it.

Lord: I heard there are only three people in the country working in Soviet economic affairs -- or some other field. Incredibly low numbers.

Kissinger: Particularly because we can't overwhelm problems with resources any more, I am prepared to defend it as in the national interest. We need to understand other societies with greater subtlety. I am prepared to defend it.

Who is the spokesman?

Saxon: Dave [Lyman] has been doing it.

Lyman: I can do it. Have you another five minutes?

Kissinger: Sure, I have another ten minutes.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-12-

Lyman: There is a long-term problem that hardly any of our secondary school teachers know anything about other cultures. What can be done?

Kissinger: I was going to ask you in the last five minutes about the problem I raised. I have been here eight years. If this lack of resonance between government and academia continues, you will see a neurotic style of government. If there is an establishment that offers a safety net, that is one kind of government. In the Nixon period, if someone had called up the President and said "we will help" -- not on Watergate, but say Cambodia -- and didn't ask for anything. The people like that are all in their late 70's -- McCloy, Harriman, Ellsworth Bunker. My generation can't do it.

The question is why after 25 years of prosperity the Communists should be coming closer to power in Italy. In Eastern Europe you can't find anyone who believes in Communism. [Laughter].

I can react to these things but don't really understand it. Like the dynamics of China. And it's absurd that 16 years after the missile gap we go through the same nonsense. There should be some intellectual opposition to this debate. Not whether we need a 750-ship navy or 500-ship navy -- professors can't get into that. But some dialogue on the nature of national power.

When we call in the professors, they either try to tell us what to do next week or that we are totally wrong. The latter can help if it is done in terms of the questions I have put. But it's usually too far gone to reflect the margin we have left. Am I right, Winston?

Lord: With very few exceptions, it is usually too long-term to be helpful. People like Scalapino can do it, but it depends on the individual.

Bok: If I had an illustrative list of the kind of mid-term problems you think you need more research -- what is falling short, what is inadequate -- my response would be to go back to Harvard and get a group of thoughtful colleagues together, myself included, and see what we can do.

Kissinger: Why don't we do that? There is one additional consideration. The problems I am most conscious of are affected by what I am most concerned with. You might say, "Look, there are other considerations you should keep in mind."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-13-

Saxon: That statement, that you are interested, would have an impact.

Kissinger: I can give you an example -- the developing countries are all concerned about technology.

Rodman: Transfer.

Kissinger: Technology transfer is something we all agree we should do. I can't get my bureaucracy to come up with three ideas I could put forward.

Saxon: ERDA has been thinking very hard about this.

Lord: I will meet with Keith Glennan and Irving [the new Assistant Secretary for OES] on this when you get back from Africa.

Saxon: Also in agriculture, there has been a fantastically successful job over 100 years of what I would call technology transfer.

Kissinger: What I will do in Nairobi is say what I am going to do. This is an example of what is politically neutral, of an area where intellectual effort would be helpful.

Saxon: The statement by you would have an impact.

Kissinger: I may not be able to get that [letter] off until I get back.

Bok: This is the only way I know of getting at the problem Henry raised.

Kissinger: I will have that letter for you by the middle of May and I will get an answer for you from Mathews by the middle of May. But I am in any case prepared to get behind it.

Saxon: We are meeting in New York on the 14th and 15th.

Kissinger: Should we meet again?

Saxon: Any general reaction we have would be useful.

Lyman: But we certainly wouldn't have the reaction Derek is thinking of. We could meet at a later date.

Kissinger: June. Good.

UNCLASSIFIED

END

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

MASSACHUSETTS HALL
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

April 21, 1976

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
2201 "C" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The crisis in international studies has worsened since your meetings with representatives of the universities in February, 1975. Despite efforts inside the government and out, the entire structure of extra-governmental research and training on foreign affairs is in serious jeopardy. We need concerted, new initiatives to reverse the tide of decline and stop the dismantling of our facilities. Universities stand ready to support such an effort by sharing the advocacy of the programs needed to accomplish that objective.

International studies have lost the main support of the Ford Foundation which alone contributed \$150 million in the last decade. Universities face deficits which prevent them from replacing foundation funds from their own resources. Help from business and private individuals, while eagerly solicited, cannot begin to fill the vacuum. State legislatures do not respond readily to calls to pay for research and training on foreign matters. Only an interested national administration, which understands the dependence of our foreign policy on basic knowledge about the world, can arrest the decline. We propose a two-part plan of action; one, in the area of advanced research, is described in the attached memorandum. Preparation of the second, dealing with broader issues of instruction and training, is being actively pursued.

In the area of advanced research, including postdoctoral work, for which there is no program of Federal support, we believe that the internal deliberations of the Government since our last visit must be brought to fruition. We understand that serious consideration is being given to a grant aid program for centers of research on foreign societies, to be administered by the Department, and funded at about \$4,000,000 in the Fiscal Year 1978 Departmental budget. We are heartily in favor of just such a program.

Page 2

April 21, 1976

We earnestly solicit your support for both parts of the action plan. The nation's capacity to understand and deal with the rest of the world faces grievous damage which, once done, would take decades to undo. Your help and leadership is essential and would bring focus to our own efforts.

Sincerely,

Derek C. Bok
President, Harvard University

Robben W. Fleming
President, University of Michigan

Richard W. Lyman
President, Stanford University

David S. Saxon
President, University of California

Introduction

Within the much broader issue of the general decline of international studies in the United States, there is a particular problem of the catastrophic decline of academic centers of advanced research on foreign societies. This memorandum addresses the latter issue and advocates a program of institutional grant aid to be administered by the Department of State, or, failing that, by some other agency of the Federal Government.

The distinction to be drawn here is between instruction and research. Though its funding is inadequate, and it has other weaknesses, there is an existing, functioning program of Federal support for centers of instruction in foreign languages and areas. But there is none for centers of research. Indeed, the Office of Education explicitly prohibits the use of its funds to support research on foreign areas.*

A Critical Decline in Support

In the absence of federal support, academic centers of advanced research on foreign societies have traditionally depended for their existence on two primary sources of support--their home universities and foundations. Although it entered the field somewhat later than the others, the Ford Foundation, in

* The full language of the prohibition reads as follows: "OE funds may be used for the development of the instructional program, permitting the recipient institution, for example, to accelerate plans for hiring of new people to round out existing staff resources, to increase its rate of library acquisitions, or to develop or rework curricula. They may not, however, be used for the purchase of equipment, for student aid, or for research and publication programs." (emphasis added) The excerpt is taken from the "Announcement and Guidelines for NDEA Title VI Modern Foreign Language and Area Studies Centers" 1976. OE does support research on the teaching and learning process under NDEA Title VI, but not on the substance of foreign areas.

To illustrate the order of decline, Ford committed \$127,000,000 to international studies in the five-year period between 1965-1970. In the next five years, that figure dropped to \$23,000,000. Support for all but a few research centers was terminated in 1972, and those few were placed on declining grants that will end this year. For 1977-78, the Ford Foundation is budgeting less than \$4 million for international studies which is to be spent mainly on non-university programs. For some of the larger centers, Ford support has dropped from peaks of \$400,000 per year to zero.

We are grateful for the generous support that Ford has given to international studies. But it would be irresponsible not to recognize that the withdrawal of that support has had a devastating effect on centers of research, for which no compensatory Federal support program such as NDEA/NDFL exists. Consequently, American university centers of advanced research on foreign areas are in crisis. All across the country, research programs, research libraries, supporting staff, and facilities for the most advanced knowledge of critical foreign areas are being cut back. Research centers, including some of the nation's largest and best, are facing extinction. Some funds trickle through, but this occurs by sleight-of-hand and the funding is intermittent, narrowly focussed, and cannot sustain the national competence. OE funds are used to support research libraries to the extent that instructional materials can be made to serve the research function. Where NDEA Training Centers still exist, and where they coincide with research centers (which is frequently not the case), overhead money from NDEA grants and from contracts

frees morsels of other funds for substitute purposes. Individual grants, contracts, and consultancies sometimes provide a margin over their costs in supplies or clerical help. It is a starvation diet and the patient will predictably die.

Why Support Research Centers?

If America's centers of advanced scholarship on foreign societies close, the nation will lose its main source of nongovernmental expert knowledge of foreign areas, the best private talent will leave the field, and the development of new talent will shrivel. If the present trend is unchecked, the United States will lose foreign competence. As we become more interdependent with foreign states, as our global access is increasingly restricted, and as our interests abroad are more widely challenged, we need the national resource of foreign area research centers more than ever before.

The involvement of the national interest in the survival and effective operation of academic research centers on foreign areas has already been recognized by the State Department and the National Security Council. On a continuing basis, the centers acquire and make available the information, provide the physical facilities and trained help, and assemble the critical masses of individual skill and talent to create and extend the nation's knowledge and its comprehension of foreign societies. They help disseminate that knowledge and constantly review and update it. They provide and maintain the pool of personnel skilled in the use of that knowledge on whom the nation constantly draws in the conduct of our relations with the rest of the world. They retrain and sustain our educators and practitioners from all walks of life including our journalists, businessmen, government officials, and

scholars, all of whom come to these centers periodically to refresh and renew themselves through their own research and that of others.

These centers constitute the apex of the entire pyramid of international education, and without them much of that effort would be wasted. They provide the data, the analysis, the interpretation, the books, the content, concepts and curriculum, and much of the personnel for the nation's international education. Ultimately, they determine its quality.

They are also the locus, outside the government, of the most informed analysis and interpretation of this nation's position and the position of other nations in the world. As such, they provide new perspectives on foreign and domestic affairs and an essential source of criticism of accepted truths in a rapidly changing and complex world.

As in most areas of advanced research and analysis, United States research centers lead and service the world. For centuries, foreign societies have borrowed large parts of their perception of reality from the West and, in particular, from the United States. As other governments suppress critical thought about their own societies, America's centers have become an international, as well as a national, resource. Their threatened closure would be a major loss. Some dedicated individuals would, of course, continue to push the frontiers of knowledge. But many, isolated and deprived of time, materials, and the ready stimulation of fellow specialists, would shift the focus of their efforts. In particular, able new recruits would shun the field. Indeed, that is already happening. As America becomes more interdependent with other countries, it can ill-afford a dimming eyesight and a growing speech impediment in understanding and interpreting other areas of the world.

A Program of Institutional Grant Aid

We understand that an interdepartmental Committee on Midterm Foreign Policy Research concluded that a program of institutional grant aid to foreign area research centers should be undertaken by the Department of State on a systematic basis. We heartily concur. We understand further that serious consideration is being given within the Department to the inclusion of such a program at a level of about \$4,000,000 in the Department's FY-78 budget, and we recognize that, if included in that budget, a share of the advocacy of the program within the Administration and to Congress would fall to academic authorities.

Several considerations lead us strongly to prefer the Department of State as the administrator of such a program. Perhaps the most important is that, among the possible candidate agencies, the Department of State is the only one that maintains a comparable, constant, expert knowledge of foreign societies. At this advanced level of knowledge and comprehension, it is essential to work with peers for a number of reasons. Since high quality work is imperative in the national interest, the judgment of experts is essential. None other will be respected. The two institutions have a common moral and professional dedication to the best development and exercise of foreign knowledge; they speak the same language and are natural associates. Since one of the main purposes of the program would be to maintain a competence for foreign policy research, in order to be able to draw on that competence by contract, the Department would have a functional interest in its efficacy. A natural dialogue about both means and ends would be encouraged between the academic and governmental specialists. We are also mindful of a potential national benefit

to be gained by establishing a basis for discourse, that is not adversary criticism, for healing some painful and dangerous alienations. At the same time, because of special vulnerability on this score, the Department would be least likely to disregard criticism by the academic community of its administration of the program, and would therefore be least liable to abuse it. In short, research centers and the Department are a natural match; neither is likely to have significant advantage, while both have an inherent common interest that should ensure equal commitment to the program.

The same cannot be said of any alternate agency of Government. The Office of Education, in particular, lacks the expert knowledge of foreign areas and has no interest in them as such. It is preoccupied with the administration of instruction and places understandable emphasis on making such instruction available ever more widely to elementary and high schools, and to the community as a whole. OE has explicitly excluded advanced research, and the academic world is aware of that exclusion. OE does not perceive itself as a consumer of foreign policy research and has no interest in it. It has a potent constituency for whom research is, at best, a tertiary concern. A program such as we envision might be an unwelcome stepchild in OE, subject to dispossession or abuse. There is no reason why OE could not administer the program, but the reasons to prefer the Department of State are manifest. It is only if a State Department arrangement proves impossible that OE or some other agency of Government should be considered.

Elements of the Program

Comprehension of a foreign society, and true competence for the application of that understanding to issues of foreign policy, require knowledge of all aspects of the society, its languages, literature, history, culture,

sociology and geography. It is not enough to know only its current politics, economics, and military might. That essential knowledge is the intellectual capital of the academic community and it comes through scholarship, which means research. Welcome, and even essential, as it is to the financial and social welfare of research centers, contract research on foreign policy or other topical issues ultimately draws down that capital. The focus narrows and the issues change too quickly to sustain the kinds of comprehensive knowledge of all societies, outside our own, that the nation must have. Consequently, the program should be conceived as an investment in the capital to maintain it; i.e., the program should support research on foreign societies in all disciplines.

At least initially, and until proven by practice, the program should be designed to sustain but not to expand existing capability. In particular, it should prevent the kind of catastrophic damage that is in prospect and, once done, would take a decade to undo. Moreover, it would be unhealthy for academic centers of research to be wholly dependent on the Federal Government. They should be expected to seek and receive support from other sources such as contracts, consultancies, project grants, sponsoring universities, and private charitable contributions. But there is no basis to assume that the national capability will survive on those sources of support alone. Thus the program as a whole, and individual grants under it, should be scaled below sole source of support levels. As the top of the total national program for international education, it should also be in reasonable proportion to federal assistance to that effort.

The program we envisage would not, and should not, duplicate any other federal support program such as NDEA Title VI. Aid under the program would

be limited to the following categories of research costs:

Released time for research: payment made to the home institution of faculty members to release them from teaching responsibilities part-time during the academic year to engage in research.

Research fellowships: stipends, normally for one-half or less of full salary, for postdoctoral research by faculty on sabbatical or special leave, and by others, including specialists from nonacademic pursuits such as journalism, business, and government service; also, under special circumstances, for completion of doctoral dissertation research.

Library: for the acquisition and servicing of research materials so specialized that they are not normally acquired for general education by university libraries.

Publication costs: to assist in the publication and dissemination of monographs and other products of research too specialized for the commercial or normal academic publishing media.

Essential support personnel: salaries and fringe benefits for library, administrative, clerical and student staff servicing the research function.

Equipment, supplies, communications: maintenance, repair, replacement of supplies, telephone, postage, etc., in support of research.

The costs of office space and utilities are not included on the assumption that they would be the contribution of the home institution, and to prevent the administrative tail from wagging the dog. Travel, due to its very high costs, is also not included.

A cost estimate must be just that, an estimate of variables in the absence of precise data. To ask how many academic centers of research there are is like asking how many parts of Government are involved in foreign affairs.

There is hardly an accredited college in the country where no research on any aspect of any foreign society is going on. At the other extreme, there probably is no center in the country that meets the ideal outlined in the footnote.* Moreover, needs will vary with size, with design of program, with availability of other funds, and from one time to the next. Consequently, the best calculation is that individual annual grants might range from a possible maximum of \$150,000 to as little as \$10,000, and that a program initially funded at \$4,000,000 annually should be both manageable and go much of the way toward attaining the modest objectives outlined above.

We believe the administration of the program in the Department of State could be relatively simple and inexpensive. There is already available in INR a close, and in many cases personal, knowledge of academic research activities across the country. A part-time officer and a secretary could do the rest. Once a year an invitation to apply could be published in the Federal Register. Beyond simple identification data, an application might consist of the following for each of the past five years: total research budget, expenditures for each of the categories of cost eligible for aid, sources of the funds expended, and a statement of funds and sources for the next year. A brief narrative statement explaining need could complete the application. The Department's selection thereafter could use the same mechanism, already in place, now used to select INR's research contract awards.

* Ideally a center of research would have the following characteristics: a separate identity in the host institution; capability for research in one or more foreign areas; a library or open libraries in the immediate vicinity with substantial holdings of specialized research materials; facilities for research including office space, utilities, furniture, equipment and supplies; clerical, research and administrative help; access to research materials and assistance in publication; availability on a year-round basis to any qualified American scholar or specialist; geographic location within commuting distance of No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/28 : LOC-HAK-275-7-11-7

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

April 2, 1976

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I'm writing to follow up on the conversation that Dr. David Saxon, President of the University of California, and I had with you after the briefing that preceded your luncheon address in San Francisco on February 3rd. As you will recall, we were discussing--all too briefly, of course--your comments on the problem of restoring our dwindling supply of intellectual capital in the field of international studies. At that time you encouraged Dr. Saxon and me to come to see you on this subject.

Since then we have been giving some thought to the issues which you raised, and have done some talking with one or two colleagues around the country. The upshot is that we would like very much to accept your suggestion that we come to talk with you in Washington about this; we'd like to do so together with our colleagues, Robben Fleming, President of the University of Michigan, and President Derek Bok of Harvard. Getting four university presidents together is not as difficult as finding time on your incredible calendar, I'm sure, but it's hard enough! The date of Wednesday afternoon, April 21st, has emerged as a good one for us, since that noon we shall just have concluded the spring meeting of the Association of American Universities in Baltimore, and could drive down to Washington quite readily before we must go our various ways that evening.

I very much hope that we can spend a half-hour with you that afternoon, preferably early enough for Dr. Fleming to catch a 5:00 p.m. plane back to Ann Arbor. I do have considerable confidence that this would be a useful session for us all.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Richard W. Lyman

Copies:

Derek Bok
Robben Fleming
David Saxon